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Abstract
We locate winning strategies for various Σ3
0
-games in the L-hier-
archy in order to prove the following:
Theorem 1. KP + Σ2-Separation ⊢ ∃α Lα  ``Σ2-KP + Σ3
0
-
Determinacy.''
Alternatively: Π3
1
-CA0 ⊢ ``there is a β-model of∆3
1
-CA0+Σ3
0
-
Determinacy.'' The implication is not reversible. (In fact the
antecedent here may be replaced with Π2
1(Π3
1)-CA0: Π2
1
instances of
Comprehension with only Π3
1
-lightface definable parameters.)
Theorem 2. KP + ∆2-Comprehension + Σ2-Collection +
AQI⊢ Σ3
0
-Determinacy.
(Here AQI is the assertion that every arithmetical quasi-inductive def-
inition converges.) Alternatively:
∆3
1
-CA0+AQI ⊢ Σ3
0
-Determinacy.
Hence the theories: Π3
1
-CA0, ∆3
1
-CA0+Σ3
0
-Det, ∆3
1
-CA0+AQI,
and∆3
1
-CA0 are in strictly descending order of strength.
1
1 Introduction
The work in this paper was, initially at least, motivated by trying to see
how the theory of arithmetical quasi-inductive definitions (AQI as defined
below) fits inwithother subsystemsof secondorder number theory.Wehad
beenworkingwith one example of such a definition, essentially a recursive
quasi-inductive definition, and had calculated certain ordinals where such
definitions reached fixedpoints or exhibited a loopingconvergence [17] and
[16]. Earlier J. Burgess [2] had in fact distilled fromH. Herzberger's notion
of a revision sequence [8] the notion of arithmetically quasi-inductive, and
shown that the same ordinals appeared. (Herzberger's notionwas connected
with a `` truth operator'' and thus, strictly speaking is not arithmetic, but just
beyond; however this only makes for a trivial difference.) Other examples
of constructions involving suchquasi-inductive definitions have appeared in
the theory of truth [4], and in theoretical computer science: S.Kreutzer in
[10] uses essentially arithmetical quasi-inductive definitions to formulate a
notionof semantics for partial fixedpoint logics over structureswith infinite
domains in order to separate away this logic from inflationary fixed point
logic.
Here however we rather mention some of the possibilities that connect
these concepts with potential proof theoretical results on theway to looking
at ordinal systems for Π3
1
-CA0: for Π2
1
-CA0, by work of Rathjen [13],[12],
we have that this second level of Comprehension is tied up with the theory
of arbitrarily long finite Σ1-elementary chains through the Lα-hierarchy:
indeed the first level Lα which is an infinite tower of such models, is the
first whose reals forma β-model of Π2
1
-CA0. The same occurs for Π3
1
-CA0:
the first Lγ whose reals form a β-model of Π3
1
-CA0 is the union of an
infinite tower of models Lζn ≺Σ2 Lζn+1 and presumably one will need to
analyse finite chains of such models to get at an ordinal system for this
theory. Seeing thatAQI is connectedwith levels Lζ of the GodelÈ 's L-hier-
archy, withΣ2-end extensions, (albeit only chains of length 1) analysing the
proof theoretic strengthofAQIwouldbe anatural steppingstone.
Other notions of inductive definitionhavebeen tied todeterminacy. Pos-
itivemonotone arithmetical operators have fixedpoints bounded by the first
admissible ordinal ω1
ck
, and in turn strategies for recursive open (that is Σ1
0)
games are either inLω1ck (for player I) or definable over it (for the `` closed''
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player II). Solovay [12] showed that, remarkably, for Σ2
0
-games, strategies
for player I in such games occur inLσ where σ is the closure ordinal of Σ1
1
monotone inductive definitions (and for Player II they lie in the next admis-
sible set beyond it). Tanaka [15] formulated a subsytemof analysis related
toΣ1
1
monotone inductive definitions, Σ1
1
-MI0, and showed that over RCA0
it was equivalent to Σ2
0
-Determinacy. Our original intention had been to tie
inAQI with some level of determinacy. Is there anything at all analogous
forAQI?
Turning naturally toΣ3
0
-Determinacy, the location of strategies for such
games in the constructible L-hierarchy seems to be unknown. There is little
published on this question John states some results on this in in [9]. How-
ever this does not really yet reveal (at least to us) where such strategies lie.
A closer reading of Davis' proof of Σ3
0
-Determinacy showed that it was
provable inKP+ Σ2-Separation, and thus that winning strategies appear in
the least model which is an infinite tower of the formof a union of a chain
of submodelsLζn ≺Σ2Lζn+1 . Whilst we always thought it would be a happy
coincidence if Σ3
0
-Determinacy matched up exactly with AQI we never
really believed it would be so, and the theorems here show this. However
they are extremely close. We have not located the exact ordinal where the
winning strategies (for either player) appear, but we have shown that for
some games theymust appear after the first Σ2-extendible ξ0 - that is ξ0 ini-
tiates a Σ2-chain of length 1: Lξ0 ≺Σ2 Lξ1 (indeed after the first Σ2-admis-
sible µ so that the reals of Lµ are closed under boldfaceAQI). However for
allΣ3
0
games theymust appear before the first γ (indeedare strictlybounded
below) where the reals of Lγ are a model of `` Π2
1(Π3
1)-CA0'' - that is they
are closed under instances of Π2
1 Comprehension, with only Π3
1
(lightface)
definable parameters allowed (amore precise definition of a better bound is
below). Such an ordinal γ occurs before the beginning of the least Σ2-chain
of length 2: Lζ0≺Σ2 Lζ1≺Σ2 Lζ2. It seemed to us that evenwith extra effort,
finding exactly at which level each Σ3
0
game had a strategy might not be
very much more illuminating: any such precise characterisation of these
levelsmight well be in terms ofΣ3
0
games anyway, rather thansomeexterior
defined subsystem of second order number theory, or of particular proper-
ties of certain levels of theL-hierarchy.
1.1 Preliminaries
ByΣ2-Separation wemean the usual Axiomof Separation but restricted to
formulae that are Σ2 in the Levy hierarchy. By `` KP'' we shall mean the
usual axioms of Kripke-Platek set theory, but we shall assume these include
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the Axiom of Infinity. By ``KPI0'' we shall mean the conjunction of the
axiomof extensionality together with the assertion `` For every set x there is
a set y with x ∈ y ∧ (KP)y ''. By `` KPI'' we shall mean `` KP + KPI0.''
By `` Σ2-KP'' we shall mean KP with the Comprehension and Collection
Axiomschemes reinforced toallowfor∆2 andΣ2formulae respectively.
We note that KP alone does not prove Σ1-Separation. The Separation
axioms are themselves essentially `` boldface'' axioms, as they allowparam-
eters into the axiomschemes. The class of all admissible ordinals other than
ω, we shall denote by `` ADM''. For information on admissibility theory the
readermayconsult [1]. The reals of amodel ofKP+Σi-Separation forma
model ofΠi+1
1
-CA0 for i ∈ {1, 2}. We follow the definitions and develop-
ment of the theoriesΠi+1
1
-CA0 (the latter we take to include the set induc-
tion axiom) of [14]. The set of reals belonging to Lα,where α is least such
that Lα is a model of KP + Σi-Separation, are those of the minimum β-
model ofΠi+1
1
-CA0, (i > 0) (cf. [14],VII.5.17). It is well known, and easy
to see, that if Lα is a countablemodel ofKP+Σi-Separation, thenLα is a
union of an infinite Σi-elementary chain of submodels
Lζk≺Σi Lζj ≺Σi Lα. The least such α then being the first that is the union
of an ω-length such chain. As a consequence KP + Σi-Separation proves
the existence of β-models whose reals codeΣi-elementary chains of length,
say2:Lζ0≺ΣiLζ1≺ΣiLζ2.
Our set theoretical notation is standard. If z = 〈u, v〉 is an ordered pair,
then we use the functions (z)0 = u, (z)1 = v to denote the unpairing func-
tions. For D a class of ordinals we let D∗ be the closed class of its limit
points.
1.1.1 Ontheconstructiblehierarchy
We shall use some further facts about the L-hierarchy. In particular that if
ωα = α then Lα is equal to the level Ja of the Jensen hierarchy. (We shall
write Lα rather than Jα when we know that they are equal, and for the
ordinal heights of themodels of our theories, thiswill always be the case.)
We shall write Σn(Lα) for the relations Σn (for n ≤ ω) over 〈Lα, ∈ 〉
possiblywith paramters fromLα. If wewish to display the parameters p, q,
r we shall writeΣn
Lα({p, q, r}) (and similarly for Jα if needed in place of
Lα.) We shall not make much use of the fine-structure theory but we shall
use the Σ1-skolem function hα
1(v0, v1) which is uniformly definable over
such levels. Thus if 〈ϕk J k < ω〉 is a recursive listingof theΣ1 formulae of
L∈˙, with say ϕk with free variables amongst those displayed as ϕk(v0,  ,
vn(k)), and if Lα  ∃v0ϕk(v0, x1 , xn(k)) thenLα  ϕk(hα
1(k, 〈pα
1 , xiK 〉), x1 ,
xn(k)) where pα
1
is the (possibly empty) Σ1-standard parameter. The reader
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should remark that we are working very lowdown in the L-hierarchy: any
level will have at most someΣ2 definablemap fromω onto thewhole struc-
ture; everyLα of interest will haveonlyω as the single infinite cardinal, and
any stnadard parameters that occur can be taken to be single ordinals. Also
for any α there will be always a ∆1(Lα) definable map of α onto Lα
(although for α not closed under GodelÈ pairing this is not necessarily a
parameter free definition; for those α which areGodelÈ closed, the definition
is uniforminα.)
Indeed we are so far down in the L-hierarchy that we always have uni-
formly Σn-definable skolem functions. For this recall that β0 is defined as
the least β such that Lβ0  ZF
−
. (It is well known that the reals of Lβ0 are
those of the minimal model of Π∞
1
-CA0, the minimal model of full second
order analysis.) Friedman showed in [5] that if Jα  `` V = HC'' (that is
every set is hereditarily countable), then for any n there is gα
n
a Σn-Skolem
function for Jα Σn-definablewithout parameters over Jα. (The point here is
the phrase `` without parameters''.)
Remark3. It iswell known that for n> 1 there is nouniformΣn-definable
Σn-skolemfunction for all the levels of the Jα hierarchy. It is perhaps less
well known that down low, there are in fact suchaswenowshow.
Theorem 4. (Uniform Σn-Skolem Functions) For every n < ω there is a
single Σn-definition of a partial function h
n
, which defines a Σn-skolem
function over any 〈Jα,∈ 〉 with α< β0.
Proof. It is proven in [5] that for a fixedα0 byusingan inductiononn<ω
thatΣn-skolemfunctions exists. For the theoremunder discussionhere, any
Jα for α ≤ β0 satisfies the requirement Jα  ``V =HC''. For anα0 as given
and startingwith n = 2 Friedman's definition for a skolemfunction gα0
2
, is
in terms of the Σ1-skolem function which is indeed uniformly parameter
free Σ1 over all α. An inspection of the definition (on p3328 op.cit.) shows
however that it does nor depend on α0 in any way. We thus have that for
any α ≤ β0 there is indeed a Σ2-skolem function uniformly parameter free
Σ2-definable over Jα, which we shall call hα
2
. Turning to n = 3 his defini-
tion for the fixedα0 is in terms of thisΣ2-definable skolemfunction g= gα0
2
(as defined at the bottomof p3328) for Jα0, but is otherwise independent of
α0. And we have just argued that the Σ2-skolem functions hα
2
may be
assumed to be here uniformly definable. Hence so will be the Σ3-skolem
functions, defined using them, that wemay call hα
3
for all α ≤ β0. Similarly
for other n<ω. Q.E.D.
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Consequently, every x ∈ Jα (for α < β0) is of the formhα
n(i, n) some i,
n < ω. In fact the argument in the above proof readily works uniformly
beyond β0 upuntil the least α+1 such that Jα+1 `` there is anuncountable
cardinal.''
We shall alsouse the fact that if T is a recursive theoryofΣ1 sentences,
andα is the least such that LαKP+ T + V =HC (that every set is heredi-
tarily countable) then every x ∈ Lα is definable by some Σ1
Lα
term. This is
because there will be a Σ1
Lα
map, perhaps partial, of ω onto Lα: hence for
everyx there is i, n<ω withx=hα
1(i, n).
1.2 Arithmeticalquasi-inductivedefinitions.
Let Γ: P(ω) → P(ω) be any arithmetic operator (that is `` n ∈ Γ(X)'' is
arithmetic; we emphasise that Γ need be neither monotone nor progressive).
We define the following iterates of Γ: Γ0(X) = X; Γα+1(X) = Γ(Γα(X));
Γλ(X) = liminfα→λ Γα(X) = ∪α<λ ∩λ>β>α Γβ(X). FollowingBurgess we
say that Y ⊆ ω is arithmetically quasi-inductive if for some suchΓ, Y is (1-
1) reducible to ΓOn(∅). Any such definition has a least countable ξ =
ξ(Γ) with Γξ(∅) = ΓOn(∅). If we let ζ denote the supremumof all such
ξ(Γ), thenwehave:
Proposition5. (Burgess [2] Sect.14) (i) ζ is the least Σ2-extendibleordinal;
that is the least ζ so that there is aΣ> ζ withLζ≺Σ2 LΣ.
(ii) Aset Y is arithmetical quasi-inductive iff Y ∈Σ2(Lζ).
In general we shall stay with the notation that Σ denotes the ordinal
height of the least properΣ2-endextensionofLζ. It canbe shown:
Proposition6.There is a recursiveoperator Γ with ξ(Γ)= ζ.
Proof: The universal Infinite Time Turingmachine of Hamkins andKidder
([6]) is in effect such a recursive operator Γ. That ξ(Γ) = ζ is shown in
[16]. Q.E.D.
Somequasi-inductive definitionsmayreacha fixedpoint.
Definition7.We say that Γ reaches a fixed point onX, if there is α so that
Γα(X) =Γα+1(X); and if sowe call Γα(X) the fixedpoint.
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Proposition 8. For any arithmetical operator Γ, either ξ(Γ) = ζ , or else
there is an equivalent recursive operator Γ˜ which reaches Γξ(Γ)(∅) as a
fixed point, that is there is a recursive operator Γ˜ with: ∃α < ζ Γ˜α(∅) =
Γ˜α+1(∅)=Γξ(Γ)(∅).
The quasi-inductive definitions that reach fixed points (on ∅, or on
some particular inputX) forman interesting subclass. Investigation of such
is anappealing combinationof admissibility theory and reflectionproperties
of ordinals.
Propositions 6 and ? indicate that in one sense, to study recursive opera-
tors, is to study all arithmetic ones: if one has a Σn-definable operator, one
seemingly only needs to look instead at Πn+1-reflecting ordinals. For such
an operator Γ as in Proposition 4, it is easy to see fromthe definition of (ζ ,
Σ) that Γζ(∅) = ΓΣ(∅) and thuswemight call (ζ ,Σ) a `` repeat pair'' for Γ
and ∅. Again one may show for such a Γ, that (ζ , Σ) is the lexicographic
least such repeat pair. We use this to formulate a definition allowingparam-
eters x as starting inputs.
Definition 9. AQI is the sentence: `` For every arithmetic operator Γ, for
every x ⊆ ω, there is a wellorderingW with a repeat pair (ζ(Γ, x), Σ(Γ,
x)) inField(W )''. If anarithmetic operator Γ actingonx hasarepeat pair
(inField(W )), we say that Γ stabilizes alongW (with input x).
Clearly a certain amount of set theory (or analysis) is needed to show
that everyoperator stabilizes. ReformulatedusingProp. 3, this is thus:
Lemma10. KP ⊢ AQI  ∀x⊆ω ∃ξ, σ ( Lξ[x]≺Σ2 Lσ[x] ).
Wenote some facts concerning the pair (ζ ,Σ) inL:
Proposition11. (i) ([16] Thm. 2.1) Lζ is amodel of Σ2-KP (and is a union
of such).
(ii) ([17]Cor.3.4)LΣ is amodel of KPI0+Σ2-Separation0, but not of KP.
In the language of subsystems of second order number theory, the reals
of LΣ forma β-model ofΠ1
1
-CA0 together with a β3-submodel (provided
by the reals of Lζ), and in fact it is the minimum such β-model. (See [14]
VII.7.1 for thenotionof a β= β1 and βk-submodels.)
Prop. 9 (i) then already shows thatAQI is stronger than∆3
1
-CA0 since
anyΣ2-extendible is alreadya (unionof)models ofΣ2-KP. Somewhat more
formally:
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Corollary12. ∆3
1
-CA0+AQI⊢∀x(∃β-model of ∆3
1
-CA0 containingx).
Proof: In fact we have:∆3
1
-CA0+AQI ⊢ `` There is a countably coded
β-model of ∆3
1
-CA0''. This is because the former proves `` ∀x∃W ∈
WO(∃z, s ∈ Field(W ) ∧L‖z‖[x]≺Σ2L‖s‖[x]).'' ByProp. 9 (i), P(N) of the
modelL‖z‖[x] formamodel of∆3
1
-CA0. Q.E.D.
In Sections 2,3we prove the principle Theorems 2, and 1 of the abstract
respectively. These with the last corollary discharge all the abstract's asser-
tions. (The reader may consult [14] on the mutual interpretability between
theories in subsystems of second order number theory, such as∆3
1
-CA0 for
example, and set theoretical counterparts ∆3
1
-CA0
set
, or Σ2-KP. We do not
have todoany fine analysis of provability inanysuchsubsystems, asweare
typically showing that a rather strongtheory A proves the existence of
(many) β-models of theoryB.)
1.3 Strategiesandgametrees.
Weassume familiaritywith the basic notions of twopersonperfect informa-
tion games played using integers. We shall followMartin and shall assume
that such games are played on game trees T ⊆ <ωω although we disallow
terminal nodes. We let G(A; T ) denote the game with payoff set A ∩ ⌈T ⌉
where ⌈T ⌉ denotes the set of all plays in T . A position in the game is
simplya finite sequence r ∈T . For q ∈T we let Tq denote the set of all posi-
tions r ∈T where r⊇ q.
Lemma 13. Let A be arithmetic; letM be a transitive model of KPI0 with
T ∈ M. Then (i) ``G(A; T ) is not a win for I'' is Π1
M
; (ii) if this holds
then `` p is a position in II's non-losingquasi-strategy forG(A;T )'' isΠ1
M.
Proof. `` G(A; T ) is not a win for I'' is equivalent to `` ∀σ ∈ ωω (σ is not a
winning strategy for I in G(A; T ) )''; which in turn is equivalent to :
``∀σ(if σ is a strategy for I inG(A; T ) then ∃r ∈ ωω σ ∗ r  A∩ ⌈T ⌉)''. The
set {r | σ ∗ r  A∩ ⌈T ⌉} is then∆1
1
(σ, T ), andhence, if non-emptywith σ ∈
M , has an element in M . This completes (i). For (ii): let T ′ be II's non-
losing quasi-strategy for G(A; T ). Then p ∈ T ′⇔ lh(p) = k→ ∀n ≤ k (p ↾
n ∈ T ) ∧ ∀2n + 1< k(q = (p0, p1,  , p2n+1)→ ``G(A; Tq) is not a win for
I.'' 
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One should note that a quasi-strategy for II inG(A; T ) is then a subtree
of T that does not restrict I'smoves inanyway, only II'smoves.
2AQIisweakerthanΣ3
0
-Determinacy.
Definition 14. Tα
j(X) denotes the set of Σj formulae, true of parameters
fromX, in the structure 〈Jα, ∈ 〉; Tα
j
abbreviates Tα
j(∅), the Σj -theory of
〈Jα,∈ 〉.
Definition 15. Let E0 be the class of Σ2-extendible ordinals. If Ek is
defined, letEk+1 be the classE0∩Ek
∗
. LetE=∩k∈ωEk.
The classesEk we can think of as having depth k in the `` Σ2-extendible
limits of Σ2-extendible ...'' hierarchy: if γ ∈ Ek then there are ordinals γ =
µk ≤ µk−1≤ ≤ µ0 <ν0 <ν1< <νk satisfyingLµj≺Σ2Lνj for j ≤ k.
Theorem 16. Σ2- KP + ∀α∃β , γ (α < β < γ ∧ Lβ ≺Σ2 Lγ) ⊢ Σ3
0
-
Determinacy.
Proof.We shall showthat the least level of the L-hierarchy that is amodel
of the antecedent theory is a model M0 = Lδ in which Σ3
0
-Determinacy
fails. The reals of this model forma β-model of∆3
1
-CA0+AQI. The rest
of this section is takenupwithproving this theorem.
In fact we shall prove something slightly stronger in the formof the fol-
lowingLemma:
Lemma17.Σ2-KP + ∀α∃β (α< β ∧ β ∈E
∗)⊢ Σ3
0
-Determinacy.
Wedo this, using a technique that goes back toH.Friedman, bydefining
certain games Gψ so that codes for initial segments of the L-hierarchy are
recursive in anywinning strategy for the game. So henceforth, let M= Lδ
be the least level of the antecedent theory in the statement of the lemma.
LetΨ= {ψ |ψ ∈Σ1∧Lδ  ψ}=Tδ
1
be theΣ1-theoryof Lδ.2
(1) `` Σ3
0
-Determinacy '' isΣ1
KPI
.
Proof.Σ3
0
-Determinacy is equivalent to
2. Essentially we show that Ψ is a aΣ30 set of integers: see the Corollary 28 below.
AQI is weaker than Σ
3
0-Determinacy. 9
∀n ∈ ω[if A
n
is the n'thΣ3
0
set then ∃σ (σ is awinning strategy for a player
inG(An;
<ωω))]
The statement that σ is a winning strategy for Player I is equivalent to
saying: `` The ∆1
1(σ) set {x J σ ∗ x  A} is empty''. If it were non-empty
then it would have a member Σ1
1(σ)-definable and thus definable over the
least admissible set containing σ. Thus ``σ is a winning strategy'' is thus
Σ1
KPI
. We thus have a numerical quantifier in front of aΣ1
KPI
predicate, and
is thus overallΣ1
KPI. 
Hence, were Σ3
0
-Determinacy to hold in Lδ it would be equivalent to
some ψ ∈Ψ. For any ψ ∈Ψ wedefine: αψ = the least β so that Lβ KP+
ψ.
Note 18. The leastness of β ensures that every x ∈ Lαψ is Σ1-definable by
some parameter free Σ1 term tx. (In other words the Σ1-skolemhull inside
〈Lαψ,∈ 〉 of∅ is all of Lαψ itself.)
The following is straightforward:
(2) Let α¯ = sup {αψ |ψ ∈ Ψ}. Let α
′
= the least β (Lβ ≺Σ1 Lδ). Then
α ′= α¯ .
Weshall showfor every ψ ∈Ψ there is a gameGψ with aΠ3
0
payoff set,
but without a winning strategy in Lαψ. In viewof the comment just before
(2), thiswill suffice.
Fix for the rest of the argument ψ ∈ Ψ. Let α denote αψ. We consider
the followinggameG=Gψ.
I plays m0, m1,  , mi x= (m0,m1, , mi, )
II plays n0, n1, , ni y=(n0,n1, , ni, )
in theusualway, playing in the i'th round integers (mi, ni). Let z= x⊕ y.
Rules for I.
Let T be the theory KP+ V = L+ ψ. x must be a set of GodelÈ num-
bers for the complete Σ1-theory of an ω-model of T + `` there is no set
model of T ''.
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Using the Note 18 we denote by 〈M, E 〉 the model I essentially con-
structs if he obeys this rule. Wemay regard also as part of the rule that x as
given by I should be specified simply by I stating `` k ∈ TM
1
'' or `` k ∈ TM
1
''
where TM = TM
1
is the standard Σ1-code for the appropriate level of the L-
hierarchy. Also, as inLαψ, in 〈M, E 〉, every set is given by aΣ1 parameter
free skolemterm.
Note19. If 〈M,E 〉 iswellfounded then it is isomorphic to 〈Lαψ,∈ 〉.
Amongst the codes for sentences that I plays are thoseof the form
ptm∈On∧ tn∈On∧ tm <tnq
Thesewe shall use to formulate rules for player II. So far theRules for I
amount to aΠ2
0
conditionon x and soon z. (Wemay take a recursive listing
of Σ1-sentences 〈ψk|k ∈ ω〉 andwe then require ∀k∃k
′(mk ′ = pψkq ∨mk ′ =
p¬ψkq), thus the theory I constructs will beΣ1-complete; we obtain thatM
has at least the integers as standard also by aΠ2
0
condition.) Let r: ω→ ω ×
ω be a recursive enumeration of ω2 in which each (i, j) appears infinitely
often.
Rules for II.
At roundk:
if (i, j)= r(k) andnk  0, thenwe shall say that `` IImakes the
entry nk on list Li,j.''. These `Listing'Rules here require her to list terms in
a correct order. Shemaymakeanentryon listLi,j in roundk if:
Either Li,j is empty at the current round, in which case nk can be any
termts as longas I has assertedat anearlier round pts∈Onq∈TM;
or Li,j  ∅, and if ts was the last entry II made on this list, then nk can
be any term tr, again provided that I has at an earlier round k
′≤ k asserted
mk ′= ptr∈On∧ tr< tsq∈TM.
Thewinning conditions. Iwins immediately at a finite round if II breaks
one of her ListingRules just enumerated. IIwins if I fails to obey his con-
ditions onx, or bothplayers obey their respective rules andadditionally
∃(i, j) [IImakes infinitelymanyentries on list Li,j].
AQI is weaker than Σ
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This is a Σ3
0
winning condition for II on z. Hence Gψ has a Π3
0
payoff
set.
Remark 20. In other words, if I obeys his rules, II canwin if for some (i,
j) , r−1`` (i, j) in effect picks out an infinite descending chain through the
ordinals of themodelM that I reveals via the godelÈ numbers of theΣ1 sen-
tences true inM.
Remark21. II is not allowed tomake an entry indicating that ts< tr until I
has asserted this at some earlier stage. II is thus not predicting what the
model will look like below tr; by making an entry on a list she is merely
adverting to the fact that I has revealed that ts< tr.
Lemma22. I hasawinningstrategy.
Proof: I plays out all ``k ∈TM'' for all k ∈Tαψ
1
, and `` k∈TM'' for all k∈Tα
1
.
Obviously then, 〈M, E 〉 ≃ 〈Lαψ, ∈ 〉 and II has no chance to pick out any
infinite descendingchains. Q.E.D. Lemma
Thepoint is the following:
Lemma23.Let τ beanywinningstrategy for I. Let x=Tαψ
1 ; thenx≤T τ .
From this the theorem then follows as x∈Lαψ, being essentially the
latter'sΣ1-truth set.
Proof of Lemma 23We argue that, with II only playing constantly nk = 0
for all k, that I is forced to play for x a list of all the correct facts `` k ∈ /
∈ T '' for TM = Tαψ
1 . The point is to showthat if at any time I deviates from
this course of action, then he will lose - and hence the purported strategy τ
is not awinningone.
II plays `` Pass'' (nk = 0) until such a point, if ever, when I asserts k ∈
TM or k  TM whereas in realityk  Tαψ
1
or k ∈ Tαψ
1
. At this point II knows
that I's eventual model 〈M, E 〉 will be illfounded, and so she must act to
discover a descending chain. In this case we shall set β = βM =df On ∩
WFP(M). However shewill not yet know, and in fact will not at anymove
knowwhere βM lies. As (KP)M by the Truncation Lemma (cf. [1]) βM ∈
ADM. By our requirements on the theory Tαψ
1
, and upwards persistence of
Σ1 formulae, wemust have βM ≤αψ.
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Definition24.Let F :ω։ADM∩αψ+1 be some fixedsurjection.
The idea is that at rounds k where r(k) = (i, j) II will be making the
working assumption that the ordinal height of the wellfounded part of M ,
βM , is preciselyF (i), andwill be trying to findan illfounded chain through
OnM above βM. She will be working simultaneously on all such possible
βM. We shall prove that if I deviates fromenumerating Tαψ
1
, knowing that
one of them is the correct assumption, she can nevertheless be successful
andwin thegameGψ; thus I is forced toplayonly the truthconcerningTαψ
1
.
We assume then that I has played an untruth.We concentrate on a fixed
i and hence on β = βM = F (i), and describe how II canmove in rounds k
with r(k)= (i, j) .
(3)Claim∃a¯  WFP(M)∀b< a¯ (b  WFP(M)→ Tb
2⊂ T˜ =Tβ
2
.
Proof. Supposed this failed, then ∀a¯  WFP(M )∃b < a¯ (b  WFP(M ) ∧
Tb
2 ⊂ T˜ . For such b we shall show that Jγb ≺Σ2 Jb for a γb < β. To do this
we could employ a version of Theorem4 on Uniformly Definable Skolem
functions, to apply to the non-wellfoundedmodelM . To do this onewould
simply apply hb
2
(the uniformly definedΣ2-skolemfunction, as defined over
the illfoundedmodel Jb), and look at hb
2
`` ω × ω, and argue that this is a Σ2
skolemhull of Jbwhich is transtive, and in fact wellfounded, and is then a
Jγb for a γb< β. Howeverweprefer toargue for this directlyas follows.
Let ηL =df sup {c < b J ∃f ∈ Σ2
Jb, f : ω ։ c, f partial, onto}. We first
claim that ηL < β. Clearly equality fails, as otherwise that would make β
definable insideM from b. If however c  WFP(M), with f ∈ Σ2
Lb
, f par-
tial, but onto c ≤β, then the sentences ``f(n)↓, f(m)↓ ∧ f(n) < f(m) ∈
On'' are all inTb
2
andso in T˜ . This is absurdas β iswellfounded!
As there is a∆1
JηL
map of ηL onto JηL , we could equally well write: JηL =⋃
{Jα J ∃f ∈ Σ2
Lb, f : ω ։ Jα, f partial, onto}. We wish to claim that
JηL ≺Σ2 Jb. SupposeJb∃uψ(u, ξ
K )where ξK < ηL and ψ ∈Π1.
As ξK = f0(n) for some Σ2
Jb f0, we have Jb  ∃u[∃y(y = f0(n) ∧ ψ(u,
y)]. This is a Σ2 sentence and is in Tb
2
. Suppose y = f0(n)↔ ∃vϕ(v, y, n)
say for some Π1 ϕ. If σ ∈ TηL
2
and `` ξK = f0(n)'' holds in LηL then we are
done. Let δ be the least ordinal such that ∀δ ′ > δLδ ′  σ. Then {δ} ∈ Π1
Lb
,
and thus δ < ηL . Hence σ ∈ TηL
2
. We nowconsider theΠ1 ϕ. Let γ be least so
that for somem<ω,
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ϕ((h1(m, γ))0, (h
1(m, γ))1, n) ∧ Jγ  `` ∀m∀γ
′¬∃z(z = h1(m, γ ′) ∧
ϕ((z)0, (z)1, n)).''
This is a Π1
Lb
expression about γ. Nownote that for the least such γ
satisfying the above, we must have Jγ ≺Σ1 Jb. (For otherwise γ itself is of
the formh1(m′, γ ′) for a γ ′< γ and the lesser γ ′ canbe used in place of γ.)
We further note then by thisΣ1-reflectionon the quoted formula in the final
conjunct, that Jb itself is a model of `` ∀m∀γ
′ < γ¬∃z(z = h1(m, γ ′) ∧
ϕ((z)0, (z)1, n)).'' The conclusion is that the least such γ so that ``∃z(z =
h1(m, γ) ∧ ϕ((z)0, (z)1, n))'' is expressible in a Π1
Jb
way. But that means
γ < ηL . However then JηL is a model of this statement and so `` ξK = f0(n)''
holds inJηL .
Hence for such a b we have (Jγb ≺Σ2 Jb)M. However the supposition
implies there is an infinite descending chain of such b in the illfounded part
ofM . This implies that we have an infinite nested sequence ofΣ2 intervals:
there exists 〈bn|n < ω〉, 〈γn|n < ω〉 with (γn ≤ γn+1≤ < bn+1< bn), and
with (Jγn≺Σ2 Jbn)M, for n<ω. This implies that each γn∈E, and in fact in
E∗, (E∗)∗, thus contradictingour smallnesshypothesis. Q.E.D. (3)
Let 〈tk|k ∈ ω〉 be our priorly fixed recursive enumeration of the Σ1-
skolem terms (using the standard Σ1-skolem function, this could simply be
an enumeration of 〈h1(i, n) J i, n < ω〉). II makes the additional working
assumption, or guess if youwill, that tj
M = a0, where a0 is awitness for a¯ to
the truth of the last Claim. (Again the point is that II does not know in
advancewhich terminM will denote such a0.)As I revealsmore andmore
facts about his model, he must, ifM is not going to be isomorphic to Lαψ,
at some point reveal a Σ1-fact which is true inM but false in Lαψ. There
really is then suchanM-ordinal a0. IIwill, in effect, place her `guess' a0=
tj
M
at the head of her putative descending chain, on list Li,j. In order to
choose the next element of the chain II considers the set T˜ = Tβ
2. Set T0=
(Ttj
2 )M.
II nowwaits until I asserts that some σ0 is inT0, (this itself beingone of
the Σ1 facts aboutM she must enumerate) but II sees is not in T˜ . (If II is
wrong in her guess about tj of course, then she may fruitlessly wait for
ever...)
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(4) SupposeM  `` a1 < a0 is least so that ∀b ≤ a0(b ≥ a1→ (σ0)Lb).''
Thena1  WFP(M)
Proof:Were a1∈Lβ thenweshouldhave σ0∈ T˜ . Q.E.D. (4)
II may thus wait until I asserts that some such σ ∈ T0\T˜ and addition-
ally, perhaps later, the Σ1 fact that some term tj1 names the ordinal a1
defined in (4) above. And at some round l then, I must play the number
ml = ptj1 ∈On ∧ tj ∈On ∧ tj1 < tjq; once all these facts have been gath-
ered together, Agathemayat the next appropriate roundk with r(k)= (i, j),
set nk = tj1.
II nowhas two elements of a descending chain in the illfounded part of
M . Now she watches out for assertions that I makes about T1 = (T2
tj
1)M,
waiting for some σ1 assertedbyhim to be inT1 but whichdoes not lie in T˜ .
By exactly the same considerations that held at (4) some a2, tj2, are defin-
able, and so she can continue. By the end of the game, if this working
assumption about βM and tj was the correct one, the chain so defined by
continuationof this processwill be infinite, andshewill havewon.
If I deviates fromplaying the correct truth set, then at least one of II's
assumptions will turn out to be a correct one, and hence shewill be assured
ofwinning. Q.E.D. (Lemma23&Theorem16) 
Remark25. Onemight wonder whyΣ2 theories play the role theydohere.
However in this kind of game they are necessary. For suppose we tried to
do without considering Σ2 sentences but II tried to divine a descending
chain using only Σ1 sentences. AnyM-ordinal is defined by a Σ1 term tk
say. However `new' Σ1 facts about standard ordinals < βM may be true in
M . Hence II cannot use the terms alone to pick out a chain without the
danger of falling into the wellfounded part. Even if she waits to hear that a
termtl specifies a level hopefully in the ill-foundedpartwhere theΣ1 termtk
(i.e. onenotmentioned in T˜ ) becomes true (whichmaybeat amuchhigher
level than theordinal namedby tk) then this couldalso fail. For suppose that
inM there is a γ < b with γ in thewellfoundedpart, and b in the illfounded
part, and with Jγ ≺Σ1 Jb. No newΣ1 facts become true within the interval
[γ, b)M. I may artfully play terms so that II ends up choosing a finite chain
of terms namingordinalswhere newΣ1 facts arewitnesed, with bottomele-
ment b. If she drops any further using such terms, she will be in the well-
founded part. Hence the use of the device above of looking where Σ2-sen-
tences become true.
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Remark 26. Onemight further wonder whether the use of infinitelymany
lists only indicates our poor ability to devise a better game that used only
one list. However the use here of infinitelymany lists is necessary: for sup-
pose it could be effected with a single list say, then the game would be
Π2
0\Π2
0
(at least in the version described here) and it is known (see [7] that
the least level Lδ withLδ Σ1-Separation is amodel of Boolean(Σ2
0)-Deter-
minacy, and this is a verymuch smaller ordinal than the first Σ2-extendible
ζ above.
Recall the followingdefinition.
Definition 27. Let Γ be a pointclass. A set Z ⊆ N is said to be in aΓ if
there is a setX ⊆N×NN inΓ so that
Z = {n| I hasawinningstrategy inG(Xn;ω
<ω)
whereXn= {y | 〈n, y〉 ∈X}.
Thenext Corollary is ina sensemerelya restatement of the result above.
Corollary28. α¯ ≤σ3. IndeedeachTαψ
1
is aaΣ3
0
set of integers.
Proof:Let αψ etc. be definedas above.We switch roles in the games. Iwill
try and find descending chains through II'smodelM . (This is only tomake
the payoff setΣ3
0
rather thanΠ3
0
.) For ϕ∈Σ1 letGψ,ϕ be the gamedescribed
in the last theorem, except that II must nowplay a code x for a model of
T + `` there is no set model of T '' +¬ϕ. Everything else remains the same
mutatismutandis: I's task is to find an infinite descending chain through the
ordinals of II's model. Note that if ϕ ∈ Tαψ
1
I nowhas a winning strategy:
for if II obeys her rules, and x codes an ω-modelM of this theory, thenM
is not wellfounded, and has WFP(M) ∩ On < αϕ, where the latter is the
least admissible α where ϕ is true in Lα. However I playing (just as II did
in the last theorem) can find a descending chain andwin. On the other hand
if ϕ  Tαψ
1
IImay just play a code for the truewellfoundedLαψ and sowin.
This shows that Tαψ
1
is aaΣ30 set of integers.
Suppose now that α¯ > σ3. Let ψ be such that αψ is the second least
admissible greater than σ3. There is thus a set H ∈ Lαψ (definable over the
next admissible γ > σ3) containingwinning strategies for all Σ3
0
-games that
are a win for player I and in particular a set H0 of those winning strategies
for I in games of the form Gψ,ϕ. Hence membership of ϕ in Tαψ
1
is deter-
mined by searching through H0 for a winning strategy for I; this is a Σ1-
search. Hence Tαψ
1 ∈ ∆1
Lαψ({H0}). Hence Tαψ
1 ∈ Lαψ which is a contradic-
tion. Q.E.D.
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Corollary29.ThecompleteAQI set is aaΣ3
0
(but not aΣ2
0) set of integers.
3 (Boldface) Σ3
0
-Determinacy is weaker than Σ2-Separa-
tion.
We shall closely followMartin's account of Davis' proof ([3]) of Σ3
0
-Deter-
minacy. That account is performedwithin ZC− + Σ1-Replacement, but we
shall pay attention to definability considerations. It is fairly easy to see that
the proof can be effected with Σ2-Replacement and Σ2-Separation, but we
want todobetter than that. As remarkedaboveKP+Σ2-Separation proves
the existence ofmodelsM of V =L+ `` There are ordinals γ0< γ1∈ON
M
with (Lγ0≺Σ1V ∧Lγ0≺Σ2 Lγ1)''+ ∀x∃y(Trans(y)∧ y is admissible).
Notice that if M is a model as described, then for parameters t ∈ Lγ0,
Σ2
Lγ1({t})-definable subsets of ω are all in Lγ1, and are in fact so-definable
over (Lγ0)M. Supposewe set γ2=ON
M
.Weshall showfor suchanM :
Theorem30. Lγ0
M Σ3
0
-Determinacy.
By``N Σ3
0
-Determinacy'' we shall mean that for game trees T ⊆ <ωω
withT ∈N and for anyA∈Σ3
0(T ), that awinning strategyσ for player I or
II exists inN . AsLγ0, Lγ1 are bothmodels ofKPI0, the property of any σ ∈
Lγ0 being a winning strategy for such a gameG(A; T ) is absolute between
Lγ0 and the universe. This will complete the first theoremof the abstract (as
well as the non-reversibility of its implication, since by taking γ0 , γ1 ,γ2
least with suchpropertieswehave that thenΣ2-Separation fails inLγ0).
Proof:Weshall assume that V =M whereM is amodel with the above
properties.We shall thus drop the subscriptM throughout the proof. Let A
be Σ3
0(T ) for some game tree T ∈ Lγ0. We shall showG(A; T ) is deter-
mined, with either awinning strategy for II inLγ0 or a winning strategy for
I definable over - somewhat loosely speaking- Lγ2. Wesuppose that neither
player has a winning strategy in Lγ0 and shall prove that I, does. The key
lemma is the following.
Lemma 31. Let B ⊆ A ⊆ ⌈T ⌉ with B ∈ Π2
0
. If (G(A; T ) is not a win for
I)Lγ0, then there is a quasi-strategy T
∗∈ Lγ0 for II with the following prop-
erties:
(i) ⌈T ∗⌉ ∩B=∅ ;
(ii) (G(A;T ∗) is not awin for I )Lγ0.
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Remark: We recall fromLemma 13 that ``G(A; T ) is not awin for I ''
is a Π1
KPI0
statement about A, T and is absolute between Lγ0, Lγ1, and V =
Lγ2 by our elementarity properties assumed of these models; similarly if
there is sucha T ∗ as claimedby the conclusion, then (G(A; T ∗) is not awin
for I)Lγi for i < 3.
Proof of Lemma. If T ′ is II's non-losingquasi-strategy forG(A; T ), as
definedoverLγ0, thenbyLemma13(ii)membership in `` p∈T
′
'' is not only
Π1
Lγ0, but alsoΠ1
Lγi
for i= 1, 2, due to the assumedΣ1 elementarity. As Lγ0
is amodel ofΣ1-Comprehension, T
′∈Lγ0, andwe thus have that for every
p∈T :
(1) (p ∈ T ′)Lγ0 (p ∈ T
′)Lγi for i= 1, 2.Hence T
′
is II's non-losing
quasi-strategy forG(A;T ) inV .
Likewise for any p ∈ T ′ `` G(A, Tp
′) is not a win for I'' is absolute
betweenLγi for i < 3.
Following closely the original argument, we call a position p ∈ T ′ good
if there is aquasi-strategyT ∗ for II inTp
′
so that the followinghold:
(i) ⌈T ∗⌉ ∩B=∅;
(ii)G(A;T ∗) is not awin for I.
Here (ii), again, is a Π1
KPI0(T ∗) statement by Lemma 13. Thus the exis-
tence of such a T ∗ becomes aΣ2 fact about T (as (i) is simply∆1). Hence
by our assumedΣ2 reflection properties it makes no difference whether we
defined `good' relative toLγ0 orLγ1:
(2) `` p is good'' is Σ2
KPI0(T ) and hence (p is good)Lγ0 (p is
good)Lγ1
WesetH ⊆ <ωω tobe the class {p∈T ′ J (p is good)Lγ0}. Then
(3)H ∈Σ2
Lγ0(T ) andhenceH is a set inLγ1.
Wedefine the function t:H Lγ0 by:
t(p) =L-least quasistrategy Tˆ (p) witnessing (i) and (ii) that p is good.
Then t is definable over Lγ0 in T
′
, but is alsoΣ2
Lγ1({T ′}) as a relation, and,
noting thatH, the domain of t, isΣ2
Lγ0({T ′}), in fact its graph is aΣ1
Lα({T ,
γ0}) definable subset of Lγ0 for α> γ0
+
thenext admissible after γ0.
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We are thus trying to prove that the starting position ∅ is good in Lγ0,
and andwe have seen that such a quasi-strategy T ∗ exists satisfying (i) and
(ii) inLγ1 if andonly if suchexists inLγ0.
LetB=∩n∈ωDnwitheachDn recursivelyopen. Define
En =A∪{x∈⌈T
′⌉|(∃p⊆x(⌈Tp
′⌉⊆Dn∧ ``p is not good'' )}.
Then, by (2), En has aΠ2
KPI0
definition (in the parameter T ′) and again by
our elementarityassumptionswehave:
(4) x∈Lγ0 ((x∈En)Lγ0 (x∈En)Lγ1).
Note also that En can be considered a Σ3
0(H) set of reals, fixing the
good parameter set H as that defined over Lγ0. Hence, in order to differen-
tiateEn definedoverLγ1 (orLγ0) andV weset:
E˜n =A∪{x∈⌈T
′⌉|(∃p⊆x(⌈Tp
′⌉⊆Dn∧ p  H )}.
Theproof nowproceeds byshowing
( + ) ∃n ∈ ω ∀σ ∈ Σω(Lγ1) (σ is not winning strategy for I inG(E˜n ;
T ′))V
We first suppose for a moment that this can be shown. We then prove the
following:
Claim(+ )⇒∃T ∗∈Lγ0(Lγ0 `` T
∗
witnesses that∅ is good '').
Definition32. Ti
′′=df {q ∈T
′
J ∀p⊆ q (G(En, Tp
′) is not awin for I )Lγi } for
i=0, 1.
In short, Ti
′′
is II's non-losing quasi-strategy for G(En; T
′), as defined
over Lγi. `` (G(En, Tp
′) is not a win for I )Lγi'' means for all σ ∈ Lγi which
are strategies for I inG(En, Tp
′), there is x ∈ Lγi with σ ∗ x  (En)Lγi ; this
then is a Π3
Lγi
statement. We may only say that T1
′′ ⊆ T0
′′
since there are
potentiallymore strategies for I in Lγ1 than in Lγ0. Neither Ti
′′
is a priori a
set in Lγi, but are definable classes over the respective models. For i= 0, 1
wenowdefineTi
∗ ⊆Ti
′′
quasi-strategies for II as follows.
Definition33. q ∈Ti
∗
if either:
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(a) q ∈Ti
′′
and for all positions p⊆ q ⌈Tp
′⌉ *Dn; or
(b) let there be a shortest initial segment p⊆ q with p ∈ Ti
′′
and ⌈Tp
′⌉ ⊆
Dn. In this latter case, by definition of Ti
′′ p ∈ H. (The latter must hold,
since otherwise we should have that (G(En; Tp
′) is a win for I)Lγi from
position p onwards, I making use of some arbitrarily defined but trivial
strategy inLγi, contradicting that p ∈ Ti
′′
.) If the subsequent moves in q are
consistent with t(p)= Tˆ (p), thenwealsoput q intoTi
∗.Otherwise q  Ti
∗
.
(5) T1
′′⊆T0
′′
; T1
∗⊆T0
∗
; `` q ∈T1
∗
'' isΠ3
Lγ1({T ′}).
Note that Ti
∗
are still quasi-strategies for II inT ′. The following then fin-
ishes the Lemma (still under the assumption ( + ) ), since as remarked
above, `` ∅ is good'' is Σ2
KPI0(T ) so the existence of such a witnessing tree
T0
∗
goes downfromLγ1 toLγ0.
(6) (T0
∗
witnesses that∅ is good)Lγ1.
Proof: If x ∈ ⌈T0
∗], then either x  Dn or x ∈ ⌈Tˆ (p)⌉. In the latter case,
as Tˆ (p) witnesses that p is good, (i) ensures that x  B. Thus ⌈T0
∗⌉ ∩ B =
∅.Wemust next show that
Claim: ∀σ ∈Lγ1(σ is not awinningstrategy for I inG(A;T1
∗)) .
Suppose for a contradiction that σ ∈Lγ1 were awinning strategy for him
in this game.
Subclaim1∀y(σ ∗ y ∈ [T1
′′]).
Proof: There cannot be a least position p ∈ T1
′′
consistent with
σ so that ⌈Tp
′⌉ ⊆ Dn: for otherwise for this p we have Tp
∗ = Tˆ (p) for the
same reasonas before: if pwerenot inH we'dhave
Lγ1 `` p is not good ∧⌈Tp
′⌉ ⊆Dn∧G(En, Tp
′) is awin for I .''
contradicting that p∈T1
′′
.
As there is no such position p like this, we must have that ∀x σ ∗ x ∈
⌈T1
′′⌉. QEDSubclaim1
Subclaim2 ∀σ0∈Lγ1(σ0 is not awinningstrategy for I inG(E˜n ;T1
′′)).
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Proof: Suppose for a contradiction τ0∈Lγ1 were suchawinning strategy
inG(E˜n ;T1
′′). Weconvert this toawinningstrategy τ for I inG(E˜n , T
′).
We define τ by initially letting I play using τ0 until, if ever, II departs
fromT1
′′
at some position p; then, as p  T1
′′
we conclude (I has a winning
strategy for G(En, Tp
′))Lγ1 and the latter statement is absolute. I may con-
tinue playing using the Lγ1-least such winning strategy, which wemay call
σp.
By continuing to play with σp he wins overall G(E˜n , T
′). The map pi
p֌ σp is definable over Lγ1, and hence the overall cumulative strategy τ
wehave just implicitly described is alsodefinable over Lγ1 frompi and τ0. It
is thus an element of Σω(Lγ1). If II never departs from T1
′′
and I uses τ0
throughout, then thiswas also awinning runof play inG(E˜n , T
′). However
the existence of τ contradicts (+ ). QEDSubclaim2
In particular, using Subclaim 2: as σ ∈ Lγ1, σ itself is not a winning
strategy for I inG(E˜n ;T1
′′)). Hence there is a playx= σ ∗ x0 consistent with
σ satisfyingx  E˜n As E˜n ⊇A, we thus have x  A. However it was origi-
nally assumed that σ was awinning strategy for I inG(A; T1
∗). BySubclaim
1σ ∗x0∈ [T1
′′]∩ [T1
∗]. This is a contradiction! QEDClaim
(7) (G(A;T0
∗) is not awin for I )Lγ1.
Proof: By the Claim, there is no σ ∈ Lγ1 a winning strategy for I in
G(A; T1
∗). However T1
∗ ⊆ T0
∗
and T1
∗
does not restrict any of I's moves.
Thence (7) holds. QED(6), (7)
(8) There is suchaT ∗ witnessing that∅ is goodwithT ∗∈Lγ0.
Proof: By (6) and (7) we see that a T0
∗
witnessing the requisite Σ2 for-
mula can be constructed definably over Lγ0 fromT . Thus T0
∗ ∈ Lγ1. Hence
byΣ2-reflectionof Lγ1 there is thensuchaT
∗∈Lγ0. QED(7)
We thus have to showthat (+) aboveholds.We showed that:
∅ is not good
∀n∈ω (There is awinningstrategy for I inG(∆4;T
′) definableoverLγ1).
Ifwedefine:
E˜n
p
=A∪{x∈⌈T ′⌉|(∃q ⊆x(p⊆ q ∧⌈Tq
′⌉⊆Dn∧ q  H)}
then the sameargument shows that:
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(9) ∀p ∈ T ′( p is not good ∀n ∈ ω(There is awinning strategy for I
inG(E˜n
p
;Tp
′)) definable overLγ1).
We suppose the lemma false and obtain a contradiction by building a
winningstrategyσ for I for the gameG(A;T ′)which is definable overLγ1.
Wedefine the function s:H × ω Lγ1 definedby: s(p, n) = Σω(Lγ1)-
least winning strategy for I in G(E˜n
p
; Tp
′). By (9) this function is well
defined, and total, onH ×ω andmoreover isΣω
Lγ1({H, T ′}). Let σ0 = s(∅,
0). Then σ0 is awinning strategy for I inG(E˜0; T
′). σ agreeswithσ0 until a
first, if suchoccurs, position p0 is reachedwith ⌈Tp0
′ ⌉⊆D0 but p0  H. If so,
then we use the strategy σ1 = s(p0, 1) for I in G(E˜1
p0
; Tp0
′ ). σ now agrees
with σ1 until, if ever, a position p2 is reachedwith ⌈Tp1
′ ⌉ ⊆D1 but p1 is not
good. The play continues using σ2 = s(p2, 2). If q = ∪n∈ω pn is a non-ter-
minal position, we let σ take some arbitrary but canonical choice on posi-
tions extending q. The strategyσ is thendefinable bya recursionover Jγ1+1.
(10) If x∈V is anyplayconsistent withσ thenx∈A.
Proof: Suppose firstlywehave that for some n pn⊆ x is undefined. This
implies that there is no initial position p⊆ x with (a)pn−1⊆ p (ifn>0); (b)
⌈Tp
′⌉ ⊆Dn, and (c) p  H. On the other hand, if all the pn are defined, then
we shall have that x ∈ ∩n∈ω Dn ⊆ B ⊆ A. Either way we have shown that
any play x ∈ V arising from following the strategy σ lies in A ∩ [T ′].
QED(10)
However T ′ is defined over Lγ0 to be II's non-losing quasi-strategy in
G(A; T ) and at (1) it was shown that T ′ had this property V or equivalently
either of themodels Lγ0, Lγ1. This contradicts (10)! This finishes the proof
of theLemma. QEDLemma
The proof of the theorem now follows Martin [11] pretty much ver-
batimbut again paying attention to definability issues. We repeatedly apply
the Lemma with A = ∪n∈ω An and each An ∈ Π2
0
, acting in turn as an
instance of B in theLemma. This is aΣ2-recursiondefining a strategy τ for
II over Lγ0 since all the relevant quasi-strategies given by the Lemma lie in
thismodel. These details nowfollow.
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One applies the lemma with B = A0 obtaining a quasi-strategy for II:
T ∗(∅). By Σ2-reflection the L-least such lies in Lγ0, and we shall assume
that T ∗(∅) refers to it. For any position p1 ∈ T with lh(p1) = 1, let τ(p1) be
some arbitrary but fixed move in T ′(∅), II's non-losing quasi-strategy for
the game G(A, T ∗(∅)). The relation `` p ∈ T ′(∅)'' is Π1
Lγ0({T ∗(∅)}) and
hence `` y = T ′(∅)'' ∈∆2
Lγ0({T ∗(∅)}) and thus T ′(∅) also lies inLγ0. For
definiteness we let τ (p1) be the numerically least move. For any play, p2
say, of length 2 consistent with the above definition of τ so far, we apply
the lemma againwithB =A1 andwith (T
∗(∅))p2 replacingT . This yields a
quasi-strategy for II, call it T ∗(p2), which is definable in aΣ2 wayover Lγ0,
in the parameter (T ∗(∅))p2. Let T
′(p2) ∈ Lγ0 be II's non-losing quasi-
strategy for G(A, T ∗(p2)), this time with `` y = T
′(p2)''∈ ∆2
Lγ0({T ∗(p2)}).
Again for p3 ∈ T
∗(p2) any position of length 3, let τ (p3) be some arbitrary
but fixedmove in T ′(p2). Nowwe consider appropriate moves p4 of length
4, and reapply the lemma with B = A2 and (T
∗(p2))p4. Continuing in this
wayweobtain a strategy τ for II, so that τ ↾ 2k+1ω, for k <ω, is definedby
a recursion that isΣ2
Lγ0({T }). AsLγ0 Σ2-KP, we have that τ ∈Lγ0. If x is
any play consistent with τ , then for every n, by the defining properties of
T ∗(p2n) given by the relevant application of the lemma, x ∈ ⌈T
∗(x ↾ 2n)⌉ ⊆
¬An. Hence x  A, and τ is awinning strategy for II as required.
QED(Theorem)
Corollary 34. Let A ∈ Σ3
0
. Suppose T is a suitable game tree for A; then if
(γ0, γ1, γ2) are the lexicographic least triple of ordinals with: γ0< γ1< γ2;
with T ∈ Lγ0; Lγ0≺Σ2 Lγ1 andLγ0≺Σ1 Lγ2 KPI0, thenLγ0  `` G(A, T ) is
determined''.
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